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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has strengthened
the ability of states to assert immunity from suit by private
actors through the Eleventh Amendment.' Through the current
structure of Eleventh Amendment immunity jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has increased states' rights while limiting
individual rights. The Supreme Court, however, has not
confronted Eleventh Amendment immunity in the international
context. Specifically, the Court has failed to address whether
states can assert their Eleventh Amendment immunity against
suit by private actors for violations of treaties and international
agreements.! This question represents the inherent tension
between state treaty obligations and state sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment.
As the world becomes increasingly global in nature,' this
issue could create serious consequences for the flow of
international business and trade across foreign borders. The
ability of the United States to cohesively develop foreign trade,
including the exporting and importing of goods and services,
creates an incentive for the United States to adhere to treaty
obligations. Although the Supreme Court has limited Eleventh
Amendment immunity jurisprudence to the domestic arena, far-
reaching consequences could occur if Eleventh Amendment
immunity is extended to states' violations of federal obligations
across borders. Moreover, the Supreme Court's reluctance to
address the availability of Eleventh Amendment immunity to
states in private suit for violation of treaties may also deter other
countries from engaging in trade with the United States, for fear
1. The Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution provides: "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh
Amendment prevents suits against a state, state agencies, and arms of the state by
private actors in federal court.
2. See James G. Wilson, The Eleventh Amendment Cases: Going "Too Far" with
Judicial Neofederalism, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1687, 1713-14 (2000) (suggesting the
importance and necessity of the Supreme Court deciding "whether private parties will be
able to sue states and their agents for violations of international treaties").
3. See Richard Rivlin, Technology Links Lead the Charge: International vs the US
Market, TIMES (LONDON), Sep. 22, 1999, at 2 (suggesting the rise and impact of
globalization on the world market). Today, more American employment revolves around
foreign trade than ever before. See Richard Foster, World Trade Hits Home for Many
Americans, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Febraury 4, 2001, at 1J.
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that individual states could circumvent the treaty process.
Such a Supreme Court decision could have particularly far-
reaching effects on United States' trade with Latin America. In
light of current President George W. Bush's commitment to free
trade in the western hemisphere, a large increase in trade with
Latin American nations is predicted to occur in the next decade.4
Free trade with Latin America and other countries may soon
occur through the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), an
agreement Bush is currently aggressively pursuing! In addition,
a new United States law, which takes effect in March of 2001,
opens limited trade access to Cuba.6 Although the law was once
thought to make a negligible impact, analysts expect it will allow
a surprising influx of goods into Havana Harbor.! Such diverse
products include fertilizer, cigarettes, washing machines and live
sheep.'
Although such trade agreements are contingent on a variety
of political and economic factors, there are real possibilities of
foreign trade in Latin America taking on a renewed importance
under the pro free trade administration of George W. Bush.
Thus, Latin American nations may be reluctant to enter into
trade negotiations if states can assert Eleventh Amendment
immunity in trade agreements with the United States.
This Case Comment argues that whatever the outcome
regarding this imminent problem on the horizon, the Supreme
Court cannot uphold the Eleventh Amendment immunity of
states sued by private actors for violations of treaties. Part II
discusses the jurisprudence of the Eleventh Amendment. Part
III outlines certain treaty provisions that permit private parties
to sue states for violations of treaties and examines private
causes of action in the treaty context. Part IV focuses on the
Supreme Court's willingness to avoid the Eleventh Amendment
immunity question in the foreign arena through the use of the
preemption doctrine. Part V argues that the Supreme Court
should not uphold such Eleventh Amendment immunity because
4. See Edward Alden, Andrew Bounds, and Geoff Dyer, The Americas: U.S. Push
for Trade Pact Faces Hurdle, Financial Times (London), February 16, 2001, at 7.
5. See id.
6. See Anthony DePalma, Waiting at the Gate for Trade with Cuba, N.Y. TIMES,





of the principles set forth in the Supremacy Clause and focuses
on lower court interpretation of Eleventh Amendment immunity
in the international arena. Part VI analyzes Eleventh
Amendment immunity from a state qua state versus state as
market participant model. In conclusion, Part VII, offers possible
directions the Court could take to resolve this issue.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
Before the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the
Supreme Court decided Chisolm v. Georgia.! In Chisolm, a South
Carolina citizen sued to recover a debt from the state of
Georgia.1" The decedent had provided military equipment to
Georgia in the course of the Revolutionary War.' The state of
Georgia refused payment on the debt, even though the Georgia
state legislature had appropriated such funds." Upon the
decedent's death, Chisolm brought suit as executor of his estate."
Edward Randolph, who represented Chisolm in the suit, argued
that Article III of the Constitution authorized suits against states
by citizens of other states. 4 The Supreme Court agreed with
Randolph and clearly held that the Constitution did not create an
obstacle to such suits."
In response to the Chisolm decision, state legislators
petitioned for a constitutional amendment preventing suits
against states by citizens of other states in federal court. 6 The
Revolutionary War had created serious problems for state
governments because they were forced to borrow money from
private investors to finance weapons, food, and supplies for their
militia."7 After the Revolutionary War, the states did not have
9. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
10. See id. at 420. The action was based on the common law writ of assumpsit. See
id. at 430. Jurisdiction was premised on the Judiciary Act of 1789 which provided that
states ould be sued by citizens of another state. See id. at 431.




15. 2 U.S. at 466. Four justices, Blair, Wilson, Cohen and Jay, found Article III
permitted suits against a state by citizens of another state. See Chemerinsky, supra note
11, at 394. Justice Iredell dissented, arguing that the plain language of the Judiciary Act
did not authorize suits for money damages against states and that suits against states
were not permitted under traditional English common law. See id. at 395.
16. See id. at 394.
17. See id. at 395.
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sufficient funds to pay back such debts. '8 State sovereign
immunity provided a bar against suits that sought to recover
these legal debts. As a result, the Eleventh Amendment was
passed by Congress in 1789.19
Hans v. Lousiana ° broadened the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment and expanded the doctrine of state sovereign
immunity. In Hans, a citizen of Louisiana brought suit against
Louisiana to recover coupons from bonds of the state.2' The
Supreme Court read beyond the plain language of the Eleventh
Amendment and held that a state cannot be sued by a citizen of
its own state in federal court without consent.2'
Over one hundred years later, the Supreme Court further
entrenched and re-affirmed the Hans decision in Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida." In Seminole Tribe, the Seminole Tribe of
Indians sued the state of Florida and Governor Lawton Chiles in
federal court for a violation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act. 4 The plaintiffs alleged that the State of Florida had violated
its duty to negotiate in good faith with the Tribe for the
formation of a compact that regulated gaming activities." The
Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the
26suit by a citizen of Florida against Florida and its governor.
Finally, in Alden v. Maine,7 the Supreme Court took a
further step in its expansion of Eleventh Amendment immunity
jurisprudence. In Alden, a group of probation officers sued their
employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938' in state
court.' The Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
barred such a suit in the absence of consent." Effectively, the
Supreme Court held that states cannot be sued by citizens of the
18. See id.
19. See id. at 395-96.
20. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
21. See id. at 21.
22. See id. at 1.
23. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
24. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(c) (1988); see also 517 U.S. at 47 (explaining that Section
2710(dX7) permits tribes to bring suit in federal court).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 76.
27. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
29. See Alden, 507 U.S. at 711.
30. See id. at 754.
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same state in state court.31
The extension of Eleventh Amendment immunity in the
domestic arena signals the increase of states' rights and the
submergence of federal law. Such a doctrine could severely
impact the international arena, if states are sued by private
actors for violations of treaties. Thus, Eleventh Amendment
immunity and United States' treaty obligations may be on a
collision course.
III. PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION IN THE TREATY CONTEXT
In order for the issue of the states asserting their Eleventh
Amendment immunity for violations of treaties to arise, the
treaty in question must provide either a private cause of action in
federal court or a federal statute must confer jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court has set forth two categories of treaties: Self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties." In Whitney v.
Robertson, the Supreme Court set forth the doctrine of self-
executing treaties. 3 The Whitney Court determined that self-
executing treaties require no legislation to become operative,
whereas legislation is necessary to carry non-self-executing
treaties into effect." In other words, self-executing treaties do
not require prior legislation for enforcement in domestic courts,
whereas Congress must enact certain jurisdictional statutes in
order for non-self-executing treaties to be enforced by the
judiciary."
Although self-executing treaties require no prior legislation
in order to be judicially enforced, the question of whether a treaty
is self-executing and whether a treaty provides a private cause of
action are not one in the same." When confronting a dispute
concerning a self-executing treaty, a court must "look to the
intent of the signatory parties as manifested by the language of
31. See id. at 760-61 (Souter, J. dissenting).
32. See Whitneyv. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
33. See id. at 194.
34. See id.
35. See Carlos Manuel Vasquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89
AM.J.INT'L.L. 695, 696 (1995) (arguing that the legislature retains an important power
over the judiciary in the international arena, because under the last-in-time rule, a
statute enacted after a treaty takes precedence.)
36. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 111, Comment H (1987) (stating
that: "[wihether a treaty is self executing is a question distinct from whether the treaty
creates private rights or remedies.")
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the instrument, and, if the instrument is uncertain, recourse
must be had to the circumstances surrounding its execution."
37
Therefore, higher courts often have the power to determine
whether a self-executing treaty provides a private cause of
action. The Rehnquist court, however, has restricted the doctrine
of self-executing treaties to provide limited private causes of
action. Even though the recent Supreme Court has attempted to
limit individual rights, some self-executing treaties do provide
private causes of action or the equivalent of private causes of
action. 8 Thus, the Eleventh Amendment and United States
treaty obligations could possibly conflict in the near future.
In addition to private causes of action, there are other
options for litigants seeking to enforce treaty rights. For
example, treaty rights may be enforced through common law
forms of action or statutory provisions that permit suit for
violations of liberty or property interests.39 Such common law
claims include actions in debt and actions of ejectment." In
addition, federal statutes may confer rights of action to enforce
treaty obligations.1 Such federal statutes include habeas corpus
petitions to enforce extradition treaties.42 Moreover, section
1983'3 and the Administrative Procedure Act" set forth causes of
action to uphold federal law against state government agencies
and officials."
37. Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
38. See British Caledonian Airways v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In
British Caledonian Airways, a group of airline companies sued the administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), arguing that that the FAA's issuance of an
administrative order, which prohibited the operation of foreign-registered DC-10 aircraft
within U.S. airspace, was in violation of Article 33 of the Chicago Convention and other
bilateral treaties. Id. at 1156-59. The court held that the treaty provisions "state rules
that may not be qualified or modified through legislation or administrative regulations
enacted by the individual signatory nations, consistent with the international obligations
undertaken by each nation that is party to the convention." Id. at 1161. Thus, the court
allowed private actors to sue an agency of the United States Government for a violation of
a treaty.
Similarly in Consulate General of Mexico v. Phillips, a United States District
Court held that a Bilateral Convention between Mexico and the United States regarding
the duties of consulates to prisoners, provided a private cause of action in federal court.
See Consulate General of Mexico v. Phillips, 17 F.Supp.2d 1318, 1322 (S.D.Fla. 1998).
39. See Vazquez, supra note 35, at 720.
40. See id. at n. 118.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979).




A. Hypothetical Example of a Claim Based on Treaty
Rights
For example, one could assert a right under the United
Nations Charter against a state and demand money damages as
a remedy.46 Certain state law provides that state government
employees speak only in English." Thus, a plaintiff could claim
linguistic discrimination against the federal or a state
government based on Article 55 (c) of the United Nations
Charter, which prohibits such language-based discrimination."
Despite the fact that state and federal law provide no cause of
action for linguistic discrimination, a plaintiff could argue that
the provisions of the Charter are legally binding on the federal
and state government under the Supremacy Clause.49 The
claimant could seek a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.50
Although litigants could attempt to file suit under certain
treaty provisions, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court would
enforce such a right. The Court often avoids upholding a private
cause of action under such treaties because the treaty may be
non-self-executing, or the conflict over the treaty may represent a
non-justiciable political question.5  The Court also avoids
deciding an issue based on treaty law because the standard may
be unclear or the Court finds no private cause of action.,
IV. SKIRTING THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
QUESTION
Recently, the Supreme Court has confronted the inherent
conflict between an increase in United States international
obligations and the rise of states' rights in the federalism context.
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed
46. See Harvard Law Review Association, Judicial Enforcement of International
Law Against the Federal and State Governments, 104 HARV. L.REV. 1269, 1271 (1991).
47. See id.
48. See id. In addition, the hypothetical plaintiff could point to Article 56 of the
Charter, which provides that parties to the agreement "pledge themselves to take joint
and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the
purposes set forth in Article 55." Id. at 1271-72 (quoting U.N. Charter 56(c)).
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 1275-76. If such a non-justiciable political question exists the Court
should defer to the President or the Legislature.
52. See id. at 1278-80.
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Eleventh Amendment immunity in the treaty context, the Court
has ruled on state violations of federal law that affect foreign
nations. In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council" and
United States v. Locke,54 the Supreme Court relied on the
preemption doctrine to resolve conflicts between federal and state
law. In both cases, the Court avoided questions of Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the international arena. Even though
the Supreme Court upheld federal rights in both Crosby and
Locke, the Court left open the possibility that states may assert
their Eleventh Amendment immunity in a suit by private actors
for violations of a treaty.
At issue in Crosby was a Massachusetts state statute that
limited the authority of state agencies to purchase goods or
services from any company engaged in business with Burma."
Only three months after Massachusetts enacted this law,
Congress adopted a federal law imposing certain sanctions and
restrictions on trade with Burma." The federal law was enacted
in response to the massive human rights violations occurring in
Burma.57 Plaintiff, National Foreign Trade Council ("Council"),
was listed on the Massachusetts "restricted purchase list" in
1998. The Council filed a complaint in federal district court,
contending that the Massachusetts law contravened the federal
foreign affairs power, the Foreign Commerce Clause, and "was
preempted by the federal act."58 The Supreme Court struck down
53. 120 S.Ct. 2288 (2000).
54. 120 S.Ct. 1135 (2000).
55. See Crosby, 120 S.Ct. at 2291. The statute sets forth companies on a "restricted
purchase list" from which state entities may not purchase goods or services. See id.
56. See id. The law is entitled the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and
Related Appropriations Act. See 1997, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166 to 3009-167(enacted by
the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, § 101(c), 110 Stat. 3009-121 to 3009-
172.) The Act is divided into five sections. Id. The first section bars all government aid to
the Burmese Government for pro-humanitarian and counternarcotic efforts. Id. The
second section authorizes the President to create and enforce additional sanctions
pursuant to certain conditions. Id. at 2292. The third section instructs the President to
establish "a comprehensive, multilateral strategy to bring democracy to and improve
human rights practices and quality of life in Burma." Id. (quoting § 570(c)). The fourth
and fifth sections are procedural in nature. The fourth section mandates that the
President report at regular intervals to certain congressional committees on the
development toward democratization in Burma. Id. Finally, the fifth provision permits
the President "to waive, temporarily or permanently, any sanction" under the act if any
such sanction is "contrary to the national security interests of the United States." Id.
(quoting § 570 (e)).
57. See id.
58. Crosby, 120 S.Ct. at 2293.
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the state law solely on preemption grounds. First, the Court
determined that Congress intended the federal Act to empower
the President with "flexible and effective authority," 9 and that
the state law would confine the President's decision making
authority because of the additional system of state economic
interference with Burma." Second, the federal law was an
attempt to "limit economic pressure against the Burmese
government to a specific range," whereas the state law had a
more far-reaching effect.61 Finally, the Court found that the state
law substantially interfered with the President's ability to create
a multilateral strategy for democratization in Burma.2
In Locke, the Supreme Court again confronted a state statute
that was at odds with federal law. The controversy arose out of
the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound,
Alaska.63 In response to the disaster, the state of Washington
created an agency designed to promulgate certain standards in
an attempt to develop the "best achievable protection ("BAP")
from damages caused by the discharge of oil." 4 Such standards
included regulation of tanker design, equipment, reporting and
operating requirements.65 Subsequent to the passage of these
standards, a trade association of oil tankers, Intertanko, brought
suit in the Western District of Washington seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief from the regulations set forth by the state of
Washington.66 Intertanko argued that the BAP standards were
preempted by federal law, specifically the Port and Waterways
Safety Act of 1972 ("PWSA").6" The district court upheld
Washington's regulations."
On appeal in the Ninth Circuit, the United States intervened
because of the substantial federal interest accorded the issue. s
The Supreme Court noted the international implications of the
conflict between the Washington statute and PWSA.7" The Court
59. See id. at 2295.
60. See id. at 2296.
61. See id. at 2296-97.
62. See id. at 2298.
63. See Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1142.





69. See Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1142-43.
70. See id. at 1142.
532 [Vol. 32:3
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
emphasized that the waters surrounding Washington, including
Puget Sound, provide access to Canada and other nations.' In
addition, the Supreme Court pointed to the fact that Intertanko
had 305 members, compromising eighty percent of the world's
privately owned tankers, of both United States and foreign
registry."
In Locke, the Supreme Court's decision reflected the
traditionally held view that interstate maritime legislation is a
matter of federal interest. 3 The Court held that certain
provisions of PWSA contravened and preempted the Washington
statutes.74 The Locke Court determined that conflict preemption
applied to Title I of the PWSA, 5 which governed problems such
as water depth and narrowness of tankers."6 Under the conflict
preemption analysis, preemption would occur unless the state
regulation was tailored to a particular port or waterway and the
Coast Guard had not adopted any regulations on the same
subject matter.
In contrast, the Locke Court held that field preemption
applied to Title II of the PWSA,' which generally regulated
tankers and crews. 7' The Court found that Washington's
regulations concerning general navigation watch principles,
English language skills, and casualty reporting were
preempted. °
The Court's treatment of state violations of federal
international obligations in both Crosby and Locke may signify a
willingness to preclude the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity in such a context or avoid the issue in the future.
Although a possibility exists for the Supreme Court, under its
current pro-states' rights regime, to uphold Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the treaty context, such a decision may
disrupt unified international federal policy -- the same problems
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1143.
74. See id. at 1151-52.
75. 33 U.S.C. § 1223, et. seq. (1978).
76. See Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1148.
77. See id.
78. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a), et. seq. (1983).
79. See Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1149.
80. See id. at 1152.
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the Supreme Court was concerned with in both Crosby and
Locke.
V. SETTING FOOT ON UNCHARTERED GROUND
The Supreme Court's current Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence poses problems when applied to state violations of
treaties. The Supreme Court should not set forth a plan that
allows states to avail themselves of their Eleventh Amendment
immunity in the face of international obligations because of the
traditional view of treaties as a uniform law which all states
must abide, the possibility of private actors having no forum to
enforce their rights, and the serious consequences that such a
decision could have on international trade and the United States'
position as a world power.
A. The Supremacy Clause and Treaties
The supremacy of treaty law mandates that states can be
sued for violations of treaties by private actors.8' Under the
Founding Fathers' vision of the United States' Constitutional
structure, treaties are equal in force to federal law.8" This
supremacy of treaty power is subject to the Supreme Court's self-
executing treaty doctrine and interpretation as to whether the
treaty provides a private cause of action.83 In addition, the
Constitution provides that cases arising under treaties are
within the judicial power of the United States. 4
Although courts have been reluctant to imply private causes
of action in domestic courts, there are certain treaties that have
been interpreted to create independent causes of action. For
example, courts have concluded that the Warsaw Convention85
81. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine: Judicial Review,
Sovereign Immunity and the Rehnquist Court, 33 LOY.L.A.L.REV. 1283, 1301 (2000)
(arguing that states should be subject to suit in state court because the value of
supremacy outweighs states' rights and damage suits against states are necessary to
ensure supremacy of federal law).
82. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[AIIl Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land...
83. See generally, Vazquez, supra note 35.
84. See U.S. Const. art. III, sec. 2. Moreover, civil actions arising under treaties,
international law, or international agreements are within the jurisdiction of the United
States district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
85. Warsaw Convention, June 15, 1934, 49 Stat. 3014, 137 L.N.T.S. 11.
[Vol. 32:3
2001] ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY 535
provides a private cause action for wrongful death. 6
Both the In Re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979 and
Benjamins v. British Eur. Airways Courts implied a private
cause of action from Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.
8 7
Other courts have also implied private causes of action in
different contexts. For example, district courts have implied a
private cause of action in Article 15 of the Treaty concerning the
Convention on International Civil Aviation88 and the Bilateral
Air Transport Service Agreement entered into between Panama
and the United States.88 In Aerovias, the court found that Dade
County regulations regarding rate schedules at the Miami
International Airport conflicted with the provisions of Article 15
of the Chicago Convention and Article 3 of the Panamanian Air
Transport Service Agreement." In construing the treaty and
executive agreement the court stated: "a treaty conferring private
rights on citizens or subjects of the contracting parties is
enforceable in the courts of justice."' As a result, the court
granted an injunction prohibiting the regulations. 2
Similarly in Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v.
Minnesota,3 the Eighth Circuit concluded that the Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians had hunting, fishing and gathering
rights in present-day Wisconsin and Minnesota under an 1837
treaty with the United States. 4 The court also determined that
86. See In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 412 (9"' Cir.
1983); see also Benjamins v. British Eur. Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 919 (2nd Cir. 1978).
87. Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event
of death or wounding of apassenger or any bodily injury suffered
by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course
of the operations or embarking or disembarking.
Warsaw Convention, art. 17, 137 L.N.T.S. at 23.
88. Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature
December 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180 Ihereinafter Chicago Convention].
89. Panamanian Air Transport Service Agreement, April 14, 1949, U.S.-Panama,
art. III, 63 Stat. 93, 2450 TIAS 1932. See Aerovias Interamericanas de Panama, S.A. v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 197 F. Supp. 230 (S.D. Fla. 1961), rev'd on other grounds sub
nor. Board of County Comm'rs v. Aerolineas Peruanasa, S.A., 307 F.2d 802 (5" Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 1961 (1963).
90. See Aerovias, 197 F. Supp. at 241.
91. Id. at 248.
92. See id. at 254-55.
93. 124 F.3d 904 (8' Cir. 1997).
94. See id. at 910-21; see also Treaty with the Chippewas, July 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 536,
art V. The Mille Lacs Band Band of Chippeawa Indians sought a declaratory judgment
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an 1850 executive order," 1854 Treaty with the Chippewas,96 and
1855 Treaty with the Chippewas97 did not restrict the tribe's
rights under the 1837 treaty to hunt, fish, and gather. The Mille
Lacs Court emphasized the importance of the supremacy of
treaty law: "Despite the 160 years that have passed since the
signing of the Treaty, it remains good law. One of the hallmarks
of our constitutional system is respect for the law, regardless of
changing circumstances or the inevitable passage of time."98
In addition, the Supreme Court should not uphold Eleventh
Amendment immunity for violations of treaty obligations because
of the Founding Fathers' inherent belief in the supremacy of
treaty law. One of the principal reasons for the adoption of the
Constitution was the failure of the Articles of Confederation to
mandate state compliance with the nation's treaty obligations.99
Specifically, the Framers were concerned that state treaty
violations could create war, prevent other nations from entering
into important agreements with the United States and negatively
impact the nation's reputation."' These same fundamental and
traditional problems could arise if the Supreme Court allows
states to assert their Eleventh Amendment immunity in suit by
private actors for violations of treaties.
The possibility of the Eleventh Amendment providing a
shield for states in the treaty context may also disrupt the
delicate federal/state balance set forth in the Constitution. For
example, states could decide to boycott United States'
international obligations through their Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
Under the Rehnquist Court's Eleventh Amendment
immunity doctrine there is a real possibility of the states
asserting their Eleventh Amendment immunity in the treaty
context. Furthermore, the rise of state sovereignty could signal a
upholding certain "usufructuary" rights in the Minnesota portion of the territory acquired
in the 1837 Treaty. See Mille Lacs, 124 F.3d at 910.
95. See id. at 914.
96. September 30, 1854, 10 Stat. 1109.
97. February 22, 1855, 10 Stat. 1165.
98. Mille Lacs, 124 F.3d at 934.
99. See Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals,
92 COLUM L. REV. 1082, 1102 (1992) (arguing that according to the Supremacy Clause,
treaties should be enforceable by individuals in federal and state court.)
100. See id. at 1110.
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departure from the traditional notion that treaty law is essential
to a unified, integrated foreign policy. 01
B. Lower Court Treatment of Eleventh Amendment
Immunity as Applied to Treaties
Although treaty-based claims or claims implicating treaties
through federal law are unique in nature, lower courts have
faced Eleventh Amendment immunity issues in such a context.0 2
In Iberia, a Spanish government-owned corporation sued the
Puerto Rico treasury secretary and port authority director.'
Iberia operated an airline business that provided travel between
Puerto Rico and Spain.' In order to fly into and out of Puerto
Rico, the Commonwealth levied excise taxes on all parts, supplies
and equipment that Iberia utilized in its business.' Iberia
contended that the excise tax contravened the terms of the Air
Transport Agreement (Treaty) between the United States and
Spain.' 6 The district court held that the Eleventh Amendment
barred Iberia's monetary reimbursement claims for past excise
taxes.' 7
The lower court decisions in Iberia and Consulate General of
Mexico indicate the judiciary's willingness to pay deference to the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity even in the face of treaty
obligations. In the near future, such decisions may have a
negative impact on the United States' ability to negotiate
favorable treaty provisions. Armed with the knowledge that
individual states may disregard treaty obligations without
recourse in court, foreign nations may be hesitant to enter into
101. See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884) (stating that "[a treaty,
then, is a law of the land as an act of Congress is, whenever it provisions proscribe a rule
by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined. And when such
rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court resorts to the treaty
for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would a statute.") This traditional
conception of treaty law in domestic courts is at odds with the ability of states to assert
their Eleventh Amendment immunity in such suits.
102. See Iberia Lineas Areas De Espana v. Velez-Silvia, 59 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D. Puerto
Rico 1999); see also Consulate General of Mexico v. Phillips, 17 F.Supp. 2d 1318 (S.D. Fla.
1998).




107. See id. at 272.
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trade, communications, and human rights agreements with the
United States.
VI. STATE QUA STATE V. STATE AS MARKET PARTICIPANT
Many of the lower court rulings involve violations of treaties
by states acting as corporations or participants in the market.'
In addition, many multilateral and bilateral treaties regulate
business activities, such as international trade,"9 between
countries rather than private individual activity. Thus, the
question of private causes of action may arise between business
entities more often than between private individuals and a state.
A possible solution to the Eleventh Amendment immunity
question may be to allow states to assert their Eleventh
Amendment immunity when they are acting as states only and to
prohibit the states from asserting that immunity when they are
acting as market participants. Under this doctrinal framework,
foreign nations may be more willing to interact with the United
States in the international trade arena, without fear of a state
refusing to adhere to treaty obligations through its Eleventh
Amendment immunity. This structure may alleviate some of the
problems associated with Eleventh Amendment immunity from a
business/corporate perspective and foster more international
trade with the United States.
The Supreme Court may be more willing to uphold such a
doctrine because of its similarity to the market participation test
found in dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. Under the
market participation test, the Supreme Court has held that state
action concerned with merely "market participation" was outside
the ambit of congressional regulation under the Commerce
Clause."' Moreover, the Supreme Court has determined that
market participation occurs when a states acts as a private
corporation or trader."'
108. See supra Part IV.B.
109. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
110. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Co., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976). The market
participation doctrine analysis has developed in more recent case law. See Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); see also South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
111. See Richard H. Seamon, The Market Participant Test in Dormant Commerce
Clause Analysis - Protecting Protectionism?, 1985 Duke L.J. 697, 705 (1985).
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The market participation model in the framework of an
international Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, may
prove problematic. In a more limited aspect than unconditional
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the market participation test
allows states to circumvent the treaty process. It creates the
same fundamental problems - allowing state regulation of
international trade - that the Supreme Court focused on in
Crosby and Locke. Such a doctrine could also pose problems in
terms of defining when a state is acting in the capacity of the
state qua state or participating in the market.
VII. CONCLUSION
Many critics have attacked the Rehnquist court's Eleventh
Amendment immunity doctrine as undervaluing federal law and
overvaluing states rights."' Scholars, however, may have
underestimated the impact that Eleventh Amendment immunity
could have on international relations, specifically treaty-based
litigation. Current globalization trends could further affect the
United States' domestic arena. For example, state and local
governments have only recently created their own "foreign
policy."'13 Such developments have occurred in response to the
impact of globalization, as state and local governments attempt
to compete in a world market and encourage investment."'
Although the Rehnquist court has severely limited individual
rights, including restricting private causes of action in the treaty
context, a legitimate possibility exists that the Eleventh
Amendment and treaty power will come to a crossroads.
The Supreme Court could address such a problem through a
variety of doctrinal rationales: continuing to decide cases such as
112. See, e.g., Roger C. Hartley, Alden Trilogy: Praise and Protest, 23 HARV.J.L. &
PUB.POL'Y 323 (2000); H. Jefferson Powell & Benjamin J. Priester, Convenient
Shorthand: The Supreme Court and the Language of State Sovereignty, 71
U.COLO.L.REV. 645 (2000); John Randolph Prince, Caught in a Trap: The Romantic
Reading of the Eleventh Amendment, 48 BUFF.L.REV. 411 (2000); Mark Tushnet, The
Supreme Court 1998 Term Forward: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of
Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV.L.REV. 29 (1999); Laura M. Herpers, State
Sovereign Immunity: Myth or Reality After Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida?, 46
CATH.U.L.REV. 1005 (1997).
113. See Mark Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism in a Post-Prinz World, 36
TULSA L.J. 11, 40 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court's Crosby decision is in conflict




Crosby and Locke on preemption grounds, ignoring the problem
and further entrenching an unworkable doctrine of Eleventh
Amendment immunity, or the possibility of the Supreme Court
applying the market participant test to Eleventh Amendment
immunity in the treaty context. Whatever the outcome, the
Supreme Court should not allow the states to assert their
Eleventh Amendment immunity because of the traditional
supremacy of treaty law, the fundamental principal that states
cannot create their own foreign policy, and the negative impact
that Eleventh Amendment immunity would create both for the
United States and foreign nations. Only by recognizing that
serious consequences could occur if the Eleventh Amendment
issue regarding treaties is not addressed can the Court signify a
willingness to adhere to a unified and cohesive foreign policy.
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